THE 12th INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE  
“DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY”  
Brașov, November 9th -10th 2017

BUILDING POLISH DEFENCE CAPABILITIES IN THE LIGHT OF STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW OF 2016

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Abstract:
Poland, like every state, needs conclusions and recommendations of the state security environment. It’s composed not only of factors influencing national defence, but also other aspects. It’s very important for comprehensive look at existing defence capabilities. Strategic Defence Review is a fundamental mechanism in the Republic of Poland for verifying the strategies of actions, their results, ways of adaptation to changing conditions and needs. Strategic Defence Review, initiated in July 2016, is for Polish State, especially Armed Forces, a recommendations of the current and future challenges. Similar processes had been conducted within the Ministry of National Defence on two previous occasions.

Key words: Strategic Defence Review, defence capabilities, national security, National Security Strategy, defence system

1. Introduction
Designing activities relating to the security of the state must take into consideration various scenarios. That requires a properly organized national security system that guarantees fast and efficient functioning in any circumstances and in response to any type of danger or crisis (National Security Strategy 2014, p. 13). The essence of these activities conditions their character which comes down to the elimination and neutralization of phenomena perceived as negative for the state. This aspect of security policy points to two complementary elements. The first one has a reactive character as regards occurring events, whereas the second one is creative and involves the preparation to absorb negative effects on the state as well as the creation of its appropriate potential.

2. Considerations
The security of the state policy determines the scope of the state capacities for pro-development activities in social, political, cultural or economic spheres, consequently forming bases for engaging the state in activities aimed at the development of its potential, which is determined by abilities to create multi-sectoral platforms of cooperation. Geopolitics has been significantly affecting the nature of national interests and strategic goals. Poland’s location between the West and the East plays a vital role. Numerous conflicts resulted in the fact that security issues have had to be in the center of national authorities’ attention for much of Polish history. Ignoring them ended in the marginalisation of importance on the international arena as it happened for instance in the time of Poland’s break-up into districts or the collapse of the state in the 18th century.
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Difficult periods that Poland often experienced in the last three or four centuries did not cause social depression and did not lead to the collapse of breaking the national spirit, but mobilized to concrete actions for the Homeland, both in internal and external dimensions. It is worth stressing that undertaken initiatives encountered a number of difficulties, which include also the problem to acquire credible allies, ready to support Poles in their struggle for independence, or strengthen the position of the Polish state on the international stage (Kośmider 2017, p. 23).

Pursued today’s concepts aimed at strengthening sovereignty require asking questions relating to the correctness and sense of history, as well as the roots of identity and statehood. It is impossible to imagine the creation of the future, also in the security dimension, without a dialogue with the past where “keys” to open prospects of survival and development should be sought. It is also important to ask about conclusions stemming from the past relating to the “character” of the Polish state and its future as these show that geostrategic location requires building a deterrent defence power of the state (arranging a defence space, building armed forces’ credibility, support of the society). The membership in NATO does not deprive Poland of its sovereignty in the field of defence but obliges to be committed to maintain and develop individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack (Art. 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty) 1.

The defence system of the state with its credible deterrence potential, perceived as defence assets, embraced in modern organizational framework, to effectively encounter a possible threat, must be the foundation of security (Poland’s National Security 2006 , p. 59–60). The contemporary security environment is characterized by “the blurring of the boundaries between its internal and external, military and non-military dimensions. The globalisation and increasing interdependence often result in unpredictability of phenomena, the scope of which is no longer limited by geographical borders, political and economic systems” (National Security Strategy 2014, p. 17).

Apart from state actors, still dominant on the international arena, non-state actors play an important role, i.e. supranational corporations, extremist groups, non-governmental organizations, social movements as they create a broad and differentiated circle of extremely different motivations, as well as ways and goals of their operation. Monitoring their activities can be increasingly difficult due to their attempts to gain access to modern technologies (The Concept of Defence 2017, p. 21). This is a qualitatively new situation that requires a change in the approach of the state to the security issues.

The designing of activities relating to the security of the state, whose role and position as an international relations entity is evolving and must take into account the most likely scenarios for developing security conditions and operations to stabilize security (promoting and developing cooperation, exploiting opportunities, preventing risks and threats), respond to crises (prevention, preparation, response, reconstruction) and defence operations (deterrence, prevention, repression) as well as those which are carried out below the threshold of war (hybrid or asymmetric operations).

On the one hand, the effectiveness of contemporary public management is guaranteed by an efficient state concentrated not only on administration but its development management as well, on the other, social trust, i.e. a helpful state, based on redefined subsidiarity principle and social capital conditions. The coupling of the efficiency of the

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1 Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that „In order more affectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately or jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”. 
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state and civic ability to cooperate stemming from social capital is particularly visible in
the times of threat and crisis.

Building the right level of national security requires a collective effort from both the
state and society as well. The role of the state remains to create a development platform
through proper social, demographic and educational policies. The assessment of security
environment, its directions in global, regional and national dimensions allows generating a
likely scenario for shaping strategic security conditions in the upcoming time (The Strategy
for the Responsible Development 2017, p. 353–359). There is no doubt that despite seeking
and preferring various forms of cooperation, it is not possible to build international
relations free from confrontation, as evidenced by the case of Ukraine or the Middle East.

The contemporary world map of threat is characterised by a great diversity, including,
inter alia, terrorism (cyber terrorism), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, hybrid
and irregular operations, regional conflicts, migration processes, organized crime,
insufficiency of states, ad also various disasters, calamities and catastrophic events and
others that exert influence on the safety and security of populations and defence system of
the state. All this imposes the necessity to undertake multifaceted actions that take into
consideration security issues. The qualitative change taking place in the security
environment causes that classical categories of war and peace are not sufficient to describe
it. Today, there is an increasingly clear tendency to broadly perceive national security
threats in close relation to international security threats both in military and non-military
contexts (Kitler 2002, p. 227).

Security, safety and development are basic dimensions of the functioning of the state.
On the one hand, without a proper level of security and safety it is not possible to ensure a
stable and long-term development of the state structures, on the other, without development
it would not be possible to improve the national security potential. The final success in the
process of security command and control in the state is determined by the compilation of
such factors as population and territory, economic and military potential. as well as the
strategy and will to implement it.

The appropriate and necessary means to ensure Poland’s sustainable national security
is the nation’s defence preparation understood as a collective national protection and
defence. Its character is defined by the Constitution\(^2\) and the Act of Law on Universal Duty
to Defend the Republic of Poland\(^3\). In order to implement this idea of great importance
from the point of view of the Polish raison d’état, it is necessary to prevent threats and
eliminate their sources using appropriate means.

Defining strategic goals and then implementing them, i.e. the formulation of national
defence strategies is expressed in “the choice of effective operational directives
constituting the core of praxeology” (Kotarbiński 1975, p. 403). Of all the directives, there
could be differentiated demands, the compliance with which is a prerequisite to achieve
national protection and defence goals, including the following:

- ensuring Poland’s invincibility as a basis of credibility and effectiveness of
deterrence, i.e. discouraging potential aggressors from using violence by
demonstrating that such actions will be ineffective and unprofitable;

\(^2\) Art.85.1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland stipulates that “It shall be the duty of every Polish
citizen to defend the Homeland”.

\(^3\) Art. 1 Act of Law on Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland provides that “The defence of
the Homeland is a matter and duty of all citizens of the Republic of Poland”. Art.4 concludes that “Every
Polish citizen, who is able to fulfill this obligation due to age and health, is subject to the universal duty to
defend the Republic of Poland”.
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- preparing in advance and maintaining readiness of civilian and military means of national protection and defence;
- taking full advantage of strategic defence of the own territory, that comprises human potential strongly connected with the patrimony and Homeland, the possibility to conduct irregular and unconventional operations (aimed at the continuation of kinetic and non-kinetic impact on the enemy), Poland’s defence space – its defence values and defence preparation of the territory.

Security tasks of the state should be considered through its specific and systemic functions. They result from its external and internal functions. The external one includes foreign and defence policies of the state. In this case, security activities involve the protection of the state interests on the international arena leading to maintaining territorial integrity and sovereignty. In turn, the internal function of the state consists in achieving and maintaining a social order. It is manifested in activities undertaken to ensure internal security through strong structures of the state, stable law, protection of the environment, social security and stable economy (Szczurek 2012, p. 37–38).

In the world which is affected by globalisation processes, the fundamental issue remains the capacity of the state to shape increasingly complex social, political, economic and cultural reality. This is due to the process of formulating the scope of personal safety and structural security, to which there will be employed assets, forces, methods and forms of operation at the disposal of the state (Foucault 2010, p. 103–115). The security of the state paradigm is the resultant of many variables, whose capturing is a prerequisite for its construction.

In Poland, there are two mechanisms for verifying strategies of operations, their results, ways of adaptation to changing conditions and needs, i.e. national security system verified by the National Security Strategic Review mechanism (the last one was conducted in 2010–20124) and defence system of the state verified by the Strategic Defence Review mechanism. In the vast majority of countries, defence reviews are carried out according to needs, i.e. in case of occurring significant events which require substantial changes in the defence system of the state. Only in the United States and NATO, the defence review is presumed to take place cyclically and is a constant element of defence planning, while strategic security reviews are treated as tools for security policy verification (Malec 2011, p. 124).

Other countries’ experience confirms that the sole need for strategic security reviews is undeniable in a broad context. However, doubts can be raised by the complexity to implement these reviews due to the analysis and proposed solutions in relation to the isolated security areas.

The first Strategic Defence Review in Poland was conducted in 2005–2006. Its aim was to define the directions of the Polish Armed Forces’ transformation so that they would be able to be fully interoperable within NATO and also to meet national defence needs in new security conditions (Report Synthesis of Strategic Defence Review 2006). By the end of January 2011, another strategic defence review had been completed which was “an attempt to enrich the defence planning process in the Ministry of National Defence with an interdisciplinary forecast of Poland’s security environment over a long time as well as resulting new defence tasks and consequently recommendations for armed forces’ transformations” (Strategic Defence Review 2011).

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4 These problems are reflected in „White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland” which was based on a secret report exemplifying activities undertaken within “National Security Strategic Review”.
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The Strategic Defence Review, initiated in July 2016, provides the basis to undertake concrete measures relating to present and future challenges and is focused on five areas, i.e. the security environment of the Republic of Poland, national defence command and control subsystem, the Polish Armed Forces’ operational capabilities, non-military defence preparations, defence planning process. The defence system’s priority is to prepare the state to defend its own territory being aware that the defence system with effective deterrence potential, in which territorial defence plays a vital role, included in the process of common military education of the youth, reserves’ training, support for local communities and non-military component in their efforts to ensure the protection of population and property in the event of (military or non-military) crisis and conducting protection and defence of important facilities throughout the territory of the country in wartime and possible occupation, cooperation with operational and support forces, as well as non-military elements system – all of them are necessary to ensure common and spatial defence of the state and at the same time carry out tasks within NATO collective defence. There is no doubt that modern military forces must be flexible and respond to increasingly diverse threats. This requires implementing real changes in the functioning of the Polish Armed Forces – cooperating with other elements of the state – from defence planning, command and control system to increasing operational capabilities and available arsenal (new weapons systems).

3. Conclusions

Taking into account various scenarios of a potential confrontation, considerable pressure must be put, inter alia, on cyberspace and information warfare battlefield, not undermining such “traditional” assets such as tanks, armoured vehicles, and multi-role combat aircraft. The members of the team preparing recommendations within the Strategic Defence Review see the need to develop new reconnaissance systems, including satellites, as well as camouflage and assault systems. They also point out to intensification of fire exchange on the future battlefield. “Remotely controlled platforms will operate to a much higher extent, executing autonomous tasks using dedicated algorithms” (The Concept of Defence 2017, p. 35). A key challenge will be to safeguard security of critical infrastructure and ensure the coordination of needs between military and non-military systems.

The process of building Polish defence capabilities must be considered not only in the context of analyzing operational capabilities that require redefining command and control subsystem of the integrated national security system, especially command and control system of the Polish Armed Forces but creating an optimal model of the Polish Armed Forces in extenso in the 2032 time frame. This will allow building a potential for collective defence and deterrence and enhance Poland’s position in NATO, especially as a keystone in NATO’s Eastern Flank. The cooperation within NATO as well as our membership in the European Union has a profound significance from the political and strategic point of view. All initiatives intended to enhance military cooperation in the Baltic, the Visegrad Group and NATO’s Eastern Flank seem interesting (The Concept of Defence 2017, p. 35). Apart from deterrence and protection and defence of Poland, the military defence system faces the need to build fundamental pro-social and pro-state ties and values. This process requires a close cooperation with non-governmental organizations and other social partners. It should activate the society in the area of defence and building a social base for

the Polish Armed Forces consisting of five services: Land Forces, Air Force, Navy, Special Forces and Territorial Defence Forces. The society, ready for action and sacrifices for the country, remains an important source and element of Poland’s defence power, as a sovereign and democratic state, a member of NATO, without neglecting the “material dimension, and even more modern technology. This requires launching appropriate educational initiatives addressed primarily to young people. Simplified and systematic principles of cooperation are needed to activate the society in the defence area and build a social base for the Armed Forces.

In peacetime, the special mission of non-governmental entities must be linked with the citizens’ preparation to counteract and function in a threat situation. Non-governmental organizations’ attributes predispose them to be included in the process of education for security and prevention activities in various areas of security, as well as monitoring threats, especially non-military ones. Meeting modern military challenges and threats by a democratic state requires modern organization of national security in which governmental and non-governmental entities participate complementing each other on equal grounds (Kośmider, Gąsiorek 2017, p. 34).

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have specific capacity to socially monitor non-military threats, especially in the area of detection, warning and alerting. The preparation of non-governmental sector for disasters and catastrophes means enhancing the readiness for forecasting, preventing and tackling effects of disasters or threats. The efficiency of security entities’ operation (armed forces, police, guards, inspections) largely depends on non-governmental organizations’ support (Strategy of Development 2013, p. 80–81). Civic activity in NGOs is often perceived as the biggest success of political and economic transformations in contemporary Poland.

Reaching the goals adopted in the Strategic Defence Review is dependent on the overall level of Poland’s economic and social development. Therefore the algorithm of operations for the defence of the country must be correlated with assumption and plans for the development of the state and defence expenditures financing, as described in the Strategy for the Responsible Development. It means reaching the defence expenditure at the level of 2.5% of GDP by 2030 (The Concept of Defence 2017, p. 13).

The Strategic Defence Review, initiated in July 2016, creates a good foundation to create effective defence policy of the Polish state, not only defining necessary directions of change but also formulating proposals for specific activities taking into account both current and potential challenges. It also creates a subject matter basis to upgrade strategies and create defence plans and programmes, especially in the long-term aspect. The first recommendations are ready to be implemented. The results of the Strategic Defence Review of 2016 seem to make a significant contribution in the Strategic National Defence Review, announced by the National Security Bureau.

References:

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