Abstract: The actual multi-headed Intelligence System, even if grouped under National Intelligence Community (NIC) umbrella, presents dis-functionalities. Why? Because each member feeds ready made products according to its own system objectives, means and vision. Those are not necessary compatible with the other systems needs, and they require additional processing to be used. Decision process is difficult, sometimes impossible.

All Intelligence Systems overlap on certain areas and block change in all of them. Each system has its own best capabilities in different areas. This issue generates either confusions, either lack of responsibility or even become public battle fields (the worst manifestation of the relationships between systems, generating a loss of credibility)

All systems have the same mission: to defend national assets (resources, people and values). All systems use their own resources (partly based on same technologies), sometimes for the same purpose, and end up with different conclusions, due to experience, perspective and authority. The waist in all kinds of resources is huge. Grouped, they might be much more insightful, powerful, and successful. But each system developed the „all-mighty” ego that should be overcome for the national interest. Other reasons block also the fusion.


Scope
This study, as whole, aims to offer an alternative model of organization for NIC, that converts it in an integrated, efficient and flexible NIS.

Disclaimer
This study is based on extensive insight in all Intelligence Services or Departments dealing with processing of classified information, from agencies to private companies and NGOs. The matter is too complex to argument in a piece of article, but some conclusions of the research are presented.
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1. Considerations

- The actual component of NIC is political. It is a malicious perspective, as Intelligence Specialists must lead the NIC.
- The actual competence of committees does not cover critical resources. All ministries should be represented.
- The contribution of each minister must be by Collection. No one should deliver Intelligence towards NIC, but only information that should be processed inside NIC according to matter, time and space (Environment 3D Map)
- NIC is coordinated by IIO, a tampon structure unable to cover the complexity of the task due to the format.
- The SCND (CSAT) is the client, but in fact, the members are the users of the Intelligence. The translation between SCND and underlying structures, done by the producer of the Intelligence is contradicting.
- The composing agencies are ignoring the Intelligence collectible from private and non-profit Intelligence Associations, that might be targeted, but relevant for the strategic evaluation.
- NIC should not deal with Data Sharing! Their access is too wide open and may compromise the National Security by accident. Sharing should be organized and administrated by the owner of database.
- The interests of second parties (alliances, partners) must be kept at the Operative Level. They should never interfere with NIC’s mission.
- NIC is the National Intelligence Collector and should be able to integrate all types of Intelligence Specialists (state, private and non-profit) in order to gain full access and cleared data. NIC membership should not be optional, but an obligation. Sharing Information (and not Intelligence!) towards NIC also.
- NIC should not be neither subordinated or controlled by external authority. The external authority stays the client/ beneficiary of its Intelligence Products. The internal organization and functional procedures of NIC must provide the assurance that integrity is the top priority.

2. Organization of NIC, Proposed Structure & Reporting Lines

1. The National Intelligence Community, as it works today, deals with INTELLIGENCE (done through the provider’s interest!, and not by the need of beneficiary necessary). Ideally, it should deal with DATA, that can be converted into analysis upon need (understanding, integrating or predicting). Here arises the first problem: NIC is not an Intelligence Processing Unit in the proper sens of the word. This should change in the first place.
2. The Supreme Council for National Defense (CSAT) is NIC’s client. But NIC is also delivering the Informative Needs to the structures beneath. Here appears the second dysfunction: NIC has no implementation authority, even the receiver’s final decision will affect the National Security. The change should be at the Intelligence Provider profile (conversion from understanding and analysis production into OPERATIONS). The operative authority must
be granted in order to assure the follow-up until the outcome is produced and the continuous feed-back/ monitoring while the change is implemented/ operated/ altered.

3. NIC’s Mission is the COORDINATION of all national system’s capabilities (the conglomerate is treated here systemic, due to reference position to other competitive systems in the global conglomerate). The Resources must NOT be limited by national strategies of compounding elements (in this approach, the public systems become elements). NIC’s ethics should be limited only to the national interest.

4. CSAT has a weakness hard to solve: politicization. You simply cannot take a secondary resource of a national conglomerate (politics) and grant it full authority in the global conglomerate, as system! The ones who must be responsible for the implementation of NIC’s directed operational changes, are... controlling NIC from the beneficiary position. There is a huge conflict of political interest Vs. National interest, a massive difference in understanding the communication register, if the CSAT member is not a military or intelligence officer and a dysfunction in authority of NIC. The members of NIC should be resourceful professionals, with incontestable integrity and scope. The proposal is to replace political competence of CSAT with military and intelligence professionals, in a heterarchical organization mode.

5. With a military CSAT, NIC will operate smooth less. CSAT has no authority in NIC, except the client’s position. NIC must be INDEPENDENT from any form of political control (President, Parliament, Government). The accuracy of NIC’s outcome (decision, behavior, influence) must be assured by its own internal process (group decision).

6. NIC’s Convertible Resources are analysis and predictions. Part of them will transform into operations (implementing changes in the component systems). Those are assured at the moment by the members of the councils. DGIA (Military Intelligence), DGIPI (Internal Affairs Intelligence Department), SRI (Romanian Intelligence Service), SIE (Foreign Intelligence) in special. But they have their own perspectives, missions, operations, outcomes, mostly conflicting from the functional point of view. As the leadership of those agencies is also... political, again, the communication register is sometimes a problem (if it did not previously coop with Intelligence). A compromise solution is the triple specialization (intelligence/military, technical and political).

7. Many important systems are not yet members of NIC in an active format. No private or NGO is present in the scheme, a huge disadvantage for the access to data, knowledge, resources. They can be integrated under the authority of the proposed main components (DGIA, SRI, SIE- extensible to 6, if considered necessary for the functionality)- see picture.

8. NIC authority must manifest maximum potential in DATA COLLECTION. NIC must have legal access to any information related to public, private and non-profit data bases and the subordinated systems (here treated as elements) must be obliged to deliver any other requested data as priority.

9. The tactical operativity of NIC is dictated by its authority towards componing systems. To grant NIC’s authority, the legal frame is a must. But it can be understood and integrated by society, after intensive promotion of the intelligence culture in the political environment (the parliament must approve, or at least mutually ... ignore the law, the president must sign it, in order to become active).

10. The considerations for the integration of private Intelligence Providers in the NIC needs no special arguments, if we regard the international landscape. All public Intelligence Services subcontract massively towards private contractors from a variety of reasons, where the most
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important is the... classification of information. When everybody opens the gates for partner sharing information, subcontracting becomes a method to ...excuse the non-delivery. Private Intelligence Providers go mostly the „old way” and cultivate relations and networking, so their access to resources is easier than for a state agency in most cases. Many arguments play in the favor of integrating private military and intelligence companies...

11. The NGOs have the special position, where the information source is looking to get in connection with them, due to different types of interests. NGOs networks are booming and covering any desired information level. There arises the need to structure all NGOs in a... minister and administrate the information by authority. Or, option 2, to structure a minister by 3 groups of operating subsystems (public, private, non-profit). This would be a more functional approach. An NGO, usually represents the interests of a group. By integrating them in NIC (directly of indirectly), NIC might control many areas where law enforcement has no acceptable access...

12. NIC’s organizational design, with the described considerations, will than be able to assure the bridging between a multiple headed Intelligence and the NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM as unitary system. It is its title that makes the difference in the public perception: community sounds more friendly than system. And the promotion of the Intelligence Culture will than ease the transition towards an official system later, when all integrated subsystems will realize that working together for a goal implies teaming.

13. In the proposed format, NIC may access all available public, private and non-profit resources. There are multiple ways to access them naturally (as „family”), to co-interest members to exchange (as „partners”) and to constrict data delivery (as „authority”).

14. The NIC’s organization has a huge potential. It may lead to the new form of government (Stratocracy). Its promotion by the integration of all types of systems, will lead to large scale acceptance. The authority wave of NIC propels to the human element’s level and triggers structural changes in behavior, decision, influence. There are many ways to motivate data delivery at the personal level, but the main issue relates to UNDERSTANDING the impact of a such act. Some do not need understanding. The reward is enough. NIC, future NIS, must cover all underlay systems until element’s level, in order to access data.

15. NIS cannot be subject to control. NIS will be the control authority of the state. Therefor, it must be a convertible entity (from hierarchy, to heterarchy and homoarchy), according to the national interest. The National Interest will be the only beneficiary. About how to deal with its personification it, in another topic. Self-regulating mechanisms of NIS are also a separate research subject.
3. **The Capabilities-Data-Change-Outcome process in NIC (Potential)**

1. Visible DATA: NIC has access to all public, private business and non-profit databases by default. The benefits of members granting access to their own databases are coming in various formats, according to the quality of delivered data.

2. Deductible DATA: NIC may request clarifications or details of any matter, if the situation arises. The request must be treated as top priority until reception is confirmed by NIC. The process restarts for any uncleared issue until case closed. The member is obliged to deliver cleared data.

3. Invisible DATA: NIC opens the gate to all incoming data by promoting understanding and reward/ compensation. This might be part of the Intelligence Culture promotion or a separate issue, according to the targeted environment.

4. NIC has authority to handle directly all the resources of subsystems, in special cases (disaster, calamity, war ...). And the obligation to compensate them when the event/ black swan/ crisis is over. Non-compliance leads to faulty element’s immediate replacement (for public systems), to authorization shut-down (for private systems) or to isolation (for non-profits).

5. NIC has the authority to change by force any sub-system , if the situation requires. For the normal operating parameters, will deliver directions, follow-up, assure feedback and
monitoring. For non-member systems the change will be assured by operational influence. All in one, the mission of the NIC is to balance its own conglomerate environment.

6. The outcome will be monitored by mandatory feed-back, permanent scanning and made-to-measures Big Data Analyzers. The entire process works as in a normal Intelligence Provider.

7. The transition towards NIS will be done when all processes run smoothly. It will be just a formal change that requires intensive promotion.

8. The Standard Operating Procedures will be Open-End (scope is prevalent). The secret is protected by the clear delimitation of space/time/matter (environmental allocation).

9. The authority elements switch by project, according to target area in the environment and matter specifics.

10. The code of ethics is dictated by National Interest (as scope). Supporting policies and compensation strategies should be implemented to balance the public impact (where it is the case).

11. The ideal change: achieving the scopes of war with the means of peace.

4. Conclusions

- The National Intelligence Community must move towards integration of all available information in the environment, towards processing its own REAL Intelligence, towards controlling the implementation of delivered analytical products.

- The issues may require promotion, operation and prediction. This forces NIC to NIS as organizational structure and processes, and will later lead to an integrated system.

- The proposed model factorizes a new form of government: stratocracy.