THE MILITARY AS A COSMOPOLITAN:
A BLUEPRINT FOR BUILDING UPON INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS

CC. Colbea Alin-Ovidiu
Ministry of National Defense /Romania

Abstract: The aim of this paperwork is to underline some aspects regarding military education in international missions from a cultural perspective.

Keywords: multicultural, cosmopolitan, military, environment

1. Introduction
One of the most known facts that appear in the last years is that things are dynamic. Speed is present everywhere and space became just an abstract word. Modern technology allows us to travel worldwide without any restrictions, from our rooms, without leaving our private space.

Information drives us anywhere. These are no more well defined boundaries. National border is now blurred when is about globalization.

Even in military society those facts are also applied. Missions are more international involved, culture is more present in day by day operations. Therefore, traditional coordinates of military actions such as: attack, defence, enemy, immediate response are now new forms: security, protect and support, confidence, building stability, etc.

2. TERMINOLOGICAL DEFINITIONS. COSMOPOLITAN, MULTICULTURAL AND INTERCULTURAL CONCEPTS IN THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT.

2.1 Cosmopolitan concept in the military environment.
The word ‘cosmopolitan’, which derives from the Greek word kosmopolitès (‘citizen of the world’), has been used to describe a wide variety of important views in moral and socio-political philosophy. The nebulous core shared by all cosmopolitan views is the idea that all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, are (or can and should be) citizens in a single community. Different versions of cosmopolitanism envision this community in different ways, some focusing on political institutions, others on moral norms or relationships, and still others focusing on shared markets or forms of cultural expression. In most versions of cosmopolitanism, the universal community of world citizens functions as a positive ideal to be cultivated, but a few versions exist in which it serves primarily as a ground for denying the existence of special obligations to local forms.
of political organizations. Versions of cosmopolitanism also vary depending on the notion of citizenship they employ, including whether they use the notion of 'world citizenship' literally or metaphorically. The philosophical interest in cosmopolitanism lies in its challenge to commonly recognized attachments to fellow-citizens, the local state, parochially shared cultures, and the like.

Cosmopolitanism favours the international over the national; it suggests that militaries should be used to fight for principles of universal justice and human rights rather than for the interests of their own nation state.\[1\] This line of thinking was demonstrated in military interventions in Sierra Leone, Indonesia, the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. Much was made that these campaigns were not about narrow self interest, but that they were about human rights. Upholding these cosmopolitan ideals was presented as being in the national interest. Prime Minister Blair made this clear in his well known Chicago speech in 1999 where he justified military intervention in Kosovo,

“This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. ... We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not. ... We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure.... today more than ever before we are mutually dependent, ... national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration ... partnership and cooperation are essential to advance self-interest...”

In a number of ways these cosmopolitan ideals involve a diminution of the role and identity of the nation state, after all, that is their purpose. Support for human rights and global values weaken states’ identities and sovereignty because their appeal is to the universal over the local and the national. Such global values lean towards individualism since they make the individual his own sovereign by emphasising the rights of the individual over those of his state community. They encourage the individual to defy the state of which he is a citizen if he believes that his state is acting improperly towards him by, for example, denying him his human rights. In the cosmopolitan world individuals have stronger obligations to cosmopolitan ideals than they do an obligation to their own state.

One of the main characteristics of cosmopolitanism in relation to humanitarian military intervention is equivocation in the face of competing pressures. First of all, cosmopolitan principles of human rights and global governance lend support to humanitarian military intervention if it is deemed necessary in order to protect the basic human rights of the most vulnerable. Humanitarian military intervention appears as an extension of the precedent set at Nuremberg: if evidence of crimes against humanity can serve as a basis for legal prosecution after the event, then it can also serve as a basis for military intervention to prevent or stop the crimes themselves. If ‘universal responsibility’ is to mean anything, it is the responsibility of those who have the power not to stand idly by when crimes against humanity are being committed and it is within their capacities to end them. On the other hand, cosmopolitanism is historically associated with the critique of militarism, the search for alternatives to war and the ideal of ‘perpetual peace’.

The ambivalence of cosmopolitanism manifests itself in the fact that individuals who share similar cosmopolitan principles can and do come to opposite conclusions with regard both to the principle of humanitarian military interventions and its application to particular situations. The question the new cosmopolitanism faces is how to deal with ambivalence without denying either side of it and without being paralysed by it.

The obstacles to reforming military forces and strategic cultures to suit the imperatives of cosmopolitan law enforcement are stark. National military forces are often unable and unwilling to conduct themselves in anything like a cosmopolitan fashion. They are trained and equipped for combat, not for rescue operations, and intervening powers are often unwilling to risk their own troops for the sake of saving strangers. Humanitarian
missions may be carried out in circumstances where the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is blurred, so that military forces trained to fight clearly recognisable opponents struggle to adapt to demanding new conditions. Humanitarian missions require political skills such as winning the respect of the local populations in targeted regions and working with locally based civil society groups, and existing military forces are frequently unable or unwilling to carry out the basic functional requirements of this political purpose. In these circumstances it is possible reluctantly to endorse military intervention on the grounds that some kind of response is better than none in the face of humanitarian crimes; it is equally possible reluctantly to condemn military intervention because the proposed remedy does not live up to cosmopolitan criteria.

In all cases we are confronted with reluctance against reluctance: a reluctance to endorse a humanitarian military intervention that does not live up to cosmopolitan criteria versus a reluctance to absolve powerful states of their responsibility in the face of humanitarian catastrophes. Once the ideal character of this cosmopolitan approach is brought down to earth, we discover that equivocation returns. This is not a reason to dismiss it. Cosmopolitan theories of military intervention perform important functions: they clarify and systematise our convictions, they provide a framework for making judgements in particular situations; they act as a stimulus for legal and institutional reforms. However, specification of criteria does not resolve ambivalence; it lifts it to another level. The downside of the specification of criteria is the radical indeterminacy present in their application to concrete situations.

2.2 Multicultural concept in the military environment.

The term multicultural describes the culturally diverse nature of human society. It not only refers to elements of ethnic or national culture, but also includes linguistic, religious and socio-economic diversity.

In order to respond better to actual international situation, military education and training system need to take into account the multicultural character of societies, and aim at actively contributing to peaceful coexistence and positive interaction between different cultural groups. Taking into account the fact that in actual international environment, borders are no longer well defined when it’s about culture and education, there are traditionally two approaches: multicultural education and intercultural education. Multicultural education uses learning about other cultures in order to produce acceptance, or at least tolerance, of these cultures. Intercultural education aims to go beyond passive coexistence, to achieve a developing and sustainable way of living together in multicultural societies through the creation of understanding of, respect for and dialogue between the different cultural groups.

After the end of the Cold War armed forces across the world, especially those of NATO member and NATO partner countries, are busier than ever before. They have to
cover the whole range of missions - from peacekeeping to combat. For this reason, armed forces are deployed in missions in an array of tasks to combat threats of a military and mostly a non-military transnational nature. These missions require more adaptive, flexible and mobile forces to deal with the broad range of tasks, and national armed forces have to cooperate intensively with the armed forces of other nations in the theatre.

In post-modern military organizations, the focus is on missions abroad, much more so than in the past. Nowadays and in the future we will be seeing multinational intervention forces (Kosovo, Afghanistan) or permanent multinational corps such as the EUROCORPS, the EUROFOR, or NATO, as a security organization. This has led to a necessary increase in cooperation between national armed forces, linked on the one hand with the “specialization” of the various national European militaries, and on the other with deeper political and military integration in alliances and security frameworks. It has also resulted in the emergence of cultural and political challenges, and these are influencing both the success and the effectiveness of military operations abroad. In the past, military operations have been analyzed mainly from historical, organizational, and institutional aspects. In recent years there has also been a growing interest in culture-related factors and issues in multinational operations.

Regarding the concept of multiculturalism and multinationality in the military, there are two different kinds of multinationality that can be observed, each with different preconditions for the working process in multinational units. Firstly, standing multinational corps in barracks in one of the participating countries: at most two to four countries are involved in these standing formations. Examples are EUROFOR, permanently headquartered in Florence, or the 1st German-Netherlands Corps, located in Munster. These units have encountered some of the sociological problems typical of multinational military formations, such as language, different ranking systems, payment and so on. But all in all smooth cooperation is possible in standing formations.

Secondly, nowadays the form of multinational cooperation more frequently observed is based on ad hoc cooperation in military missions abroad, for example in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq. Here nations from more than 40 countries may be involved in one mission. This can cause misunderstandings and jeopardize the mission goals. In most cases multinational forces are needed to intervene quickly and on an ad hoc basis in crisis situations which are ambiguous, dangerous and complex. National militaries assigned to urgent missions often have no time for specific joint training with the other armed forces. Additionally, they are subjected to different Rules of Engagement (ROE) and different legal systems governing discipline and the use of violence.

Multinational armed forces normally consist of more than two nations. When cooperation is bi-national, many problems can arise. There is always a preponderance of one party in military missions, leading to tensions and animosity. As an example, at Camp Julien in Afghanistan, most of the friction that arose was between the large minority of Belgians and the dominating Canadians. In this case there was moderate heterogeneity: two sizeable participating armed forces that formed two “blocs” and were continuously frustrating each other.

But the multinational approach is common. It is an example of high heterogeneity involving several countries and national contingents of roughly equal size, a condition which helps to optimize processes and outputs. With many armed forces of different cultures in the same mission, personal conversations about one's own culture frequently take place and friendly comparisons are made. On the whole it seems that officers are very ready to engage in such multinational contacts. At the rank and file level this readiness is less marked. In multinational missions, national units have to surrender some control and
have less autonomy. People in general, and military personnel in particular, do not like to be dependent on other nations in situations that can be life-threatening and dangerous.

As a conclusion, the most important aspect is language training for multinational forces. Usually, in contemporary military missions the lead language is English because the English speaking armed forces are those armies how bear the most burdens in missions.

2.3 Intercultural concept in the military environment. "All human beings are born free and equal in rights."

This concept is dynamic and refers to evolving relations between cultural groups. It has been defined as “the existence and equitable interaction of diverse cultures and the possibility of generating shared cultural expressions through dialogue and mutual respect.”

It presupposes multiculturalism and results from ‘intercultural’ exchange and dialogue on the local, regional, national or international level.

Forming the relational dimension of Romanian military personnel and not only of participants in international missions, represents a requirement for developing l’esprit de corps (fundamental characteristic of their professional profile), lay at the foundation of forming and strengthening convictions, contributes to shaping/reshaping military staff personality, its adaptation to various acting situations (including intercultural environments) and to the accomplishment of complex missions. Starting from these considerations, we found it useful to review the models of forming/developing the intercultural communication competence, for a future formative design where the directions of developing the communication competence become evident. Byram’s model inspired an adequate model of forming, the military system of education being easy to expand to the prefigured dimensions (knowledge, skills, attitude, education). This step must be continued with life-long training courses, respectively adequate selection and training of military personnel for international missions, together with position requirements and the development of cultural frame.

Regarding the Romanian military education, the reshaping of competences and spreading the relational construct prefigured at the intercultural dimension are brought into discussion. Normally, this reconfiguration does not aim at the relocation of funds or massive restructuring of a system already subjected to adaptations, rehabilitations and lining to standards (regarding not only its educational side, but also the military one), but at a reshaping of competences according to comprehension investment and to the reconfiguration of the requests, submitted to a present and/or future prefigured reality. But, as long as the entire Romanian higher education is configured according to Hainaut’s matrix: to know for the sake of knowing, of doing and of being, it is obvious that the simplest way is that of following the step and of development in the same respect. Therefore, a valid way of forming the intercultural communication competence within the military higher education is the one proposed by Byram. Byram model, together with the other models of intercultural communication system starts from the idea of projecting this competence on three dimensions: cognitive, affective and psychomotor, alongside with the implementation of a new educational philosophy. Hence, the projecting frame remains unchanged whereas the approach changes. Therefore, Byram model is focused on knowledge, attitudes and skills – in d’Hainaut’s perspective – but this perspective is modified, that is, skills aim at the interpretation and discovery/interaction, meaning that, in

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1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights – article 1
2 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005), art. 8
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a cumulative manner, a fifth factor – the proper system of education – contributes to a configuration of the competition.

Based on this concept, the military higher education can be extended to prefigured dimensions:

- self knowledge and knowledge of the other, knowledge of the interaction, individual and social knowledge (savoirs), by sets of transmitted content within the educational act;
- skills of interpretation and establishing connections (savoir comprendre) by comparative analysis of transmitted knowledge;
- skills of discovering and/or interaction (savoir apprendre/foire), by applying the content correctly and by going beyond the classical interpretative frame;
- attitudes resulted from the relativisation of the self and the re - evaluation of the other (savoir etre), by effective performance within an intercultural environment and by evaluating the prefigured skills and knowledge; political education and cultural awareness (savoir s’engager), by effective engagement into relations with the other for self awareness, for cognitive, evaluative and act orientation, realized by mingling of cognitive, affective and psychomotor objectives, reached during the previous phases. Political education together with the critical cultural consciousness do not impose confining within the limits of an extreme patriotism, or its dilution, but the engagement into a relation with The Other, only in terms of respect for the national and the humanity values.

Within the military environment, the openness to alterity by projecting and forming the intercultural communication competence must not be seen as an alternative to patriotism and nationalism, or as an openness to poor cosmopolitanism or as an openness to poor cosmopolitanism or as a rejection of national culture in the detriment of civilization values that exclude the first ones. Patriotism and nationalism, if they imply love and the identification with a state/homeland, that is, a nation, that appeals to political consciousness, respectively to cultural consciousness of a nation-state existence, should not presuppose restrictive, exclusive or even aggressive forms. In its essence, patriotism offers the strong motivation for acting morally [2], which presupposes the transcendence of any barriers towards the other one, the promotion of human rights irrespective of ethnicity, religion, race or type and the tolerance manifestation as a fundamental value of intercultural relations. The openness to intercultural forming and development of intercultural communication competence answer very important and critical issues regarding present actionable steps of the Romanian military staff. Participation in peace keeping missions raises problems related to the Romanian military relations with the country, the accomplishment of the mission for the country and to the use of its action for the country they represent. Intercultural education represents a way of forming in the sense of providing answers, at the other perceptive level, regarding the way in which the Romanian soldiers can cope, constrained by the oath of faith to the country, by the globalist challenges they are subjected to. The intercultural education also provides answers to unhealthy and non-attractive forms of cosmopolitanism, such as the aggressive universe, a cosmopolite strategy of destroying local cultures and institutions. Furthermore it creates a global political and cultural system, such as the hegemonic globalization, or a version in which a single country creates a united world, by subordinating other countries to the proper jurisdiction.

In the military environment, the intercultural education and, implicitly, forming the intercultural communication competence (which has attitudes and intercultural components at its basis) is shaped in the spirit of moderate patriotism characterized by interdiction of harming any one, no matter the person, special duties to the own country (but positive one
- assistance, support for everybody), increased interest towards the own country and authentic interest, but, most important for the other, moral constraints in accomplishing the national goals and obligations, not only towards the own country but also towards the other ones through their citizens [3]. Thus, exaggerations of the obligations only for the own country are abandoned, with no constraints in reaching the targets, specific to extreme patriotism, or those regarding interests with no constraints in reaching the cosmopolite targets specific to extreme cosmopolitanism.

3. TYPES OF COMPETENCIES ACQUIRED IN INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS

For all participants in international military missions it is mandatory to meet some prerequisites prior to be a part in those missions. To achieve a common goal, some objectives must be defined and ways to accomplish these objectives must be developed and mastered. Most military operations are characterized by typical stages of duration, depending on their nature, intensity, and complexity. In broad terms these stages may be defined as planning, pre-deployment, deployment (execution and force rotation), redeployment, and post-deployment.

Fig. 2

Multinational forces are often used during Operations Other Than War (OOTW), a class of mission that has grown since the post-Cold War era. OOTW include goals as varied as deterring hostile actions, combating terrorism, and providing relief from natural disasters. These missions are undertaken by coalition forces from divergent national cultures but also including non-governmental organizations (NGO) and private voluntary organizations (PVO). Each member of the coalition may have its own agenda and its own leadership expectations and style. Multinational missions vary in goals, while the participants vary in their agendas and command structure.

3.1 Pre-Deployment.

Conflict size has changed radically in recent years by the nature of asymmetrical confrontations and the use of specific revolutionary technologies in military affairs. Challenges in local, regional and global security environment, produce a big impact in the character, nature and content of the Romanian Army missions.

In this context, national military forces must respond quickly and effectively to any disaster or conflict or natural disaster, both within Romania's borders and beyond, through a strategic, operational or tactical commitment. At the same time, there is a need for forces to be able to organize and reorganize themselves quickly and efficiently in order to carry out various missions, and dispersed over a wide area of operations. Thus, military forces
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must be very flexible and able to perform various types of specific operations, both for stability and support in peace or war time. Since the beginning of participation in such missions, army units involved have improved their operating procedures from one mission to another, today is widely recognized professional competence of the Romanian military, especially their ability to adapt to social environmental characteristics, specific in theaters.

Stability and support operations are conducted in many cases in a multinational framework, so it is absolutely necessary to harmonize the doctrines that govern these operations, basic concepts, finding a common language and, moreover, the development of joint working procedures the successful completion of these operations.

Stability operations are diverse typology. The armed forces can perform the following types of stability operations: arms control, counter-terrorism, anti-drug operations support the imposition of sanctions, the imposition of exclusion zones (air, sea or land), humanitarian assistance, assistance to other nations, non-combatants evacuation operations, military assistance to civil authorities, peace operations, recovery operations (search, rescue, evacuation), demonstrations of force, protection of navigation, strikes and raids limited. These operations should be viewed as a response actions being generated by the emergence of crisis / threat; they are typically nonlinear and isolated and conducted by specific principles, respecting, where appropriate, the principles characteristic of the armed struggle.

Nature is defined by diversity, so every person is different, unique – we might say. We, as individuals, have different faces, personalities, beliefs, skills, etc. This is a good thing because that is life but to achieve a common goal, especially for soldiers is very difficult without some aditional steps. Training to achieve those skills is so important.

For a military, every mission is important no matter if is inside national territory or abroad, because it has many implications, both in the general and specialized military training. For our army, since Romania joined NATO, many military modern concepts have been introduced, because now international missions are derived from modern battlefield realities with new challenges into an extremely complex environment and cannot be countered only through military operations themselves.

It becomes quite obvious for military authorities to establish training and development programs for troops to close any critical gaps that have been identified in previous missions, and also to develop multilingual standard operating procedures, cultural awareness training, staff training at the headquarters level, and education in a basic code of ethics.

For our soldiers it is important to have proper training and skills before deployment. To achieve that goal, it is necessary to have some pre-deployment training courses.

According to a study from 2007 (“Conceptualizing Multicultural Perspective Taking Skills”), a possible training program for military theater of operations should aim at developing a wide area of competencies, such as:

- main competencies, focused on knowledge of own culture, strengths and weaknesses, self confidence and emotional intelligence
- communication competencies, such as teamwork, listening, interrelate
- personal competencies: creativity, learning, complexity, critical thinking.
- advanced competencies: understanding, integration, processing.

The purpose of pre-deployment training is to raise the level of preparedness in order to allow deployment on international military operations in the mission area. As an example, for the British Army, pre-deployment training is a critical part of successful operations abroad.
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As part of its pre-deployment training, a battalion will spend a certain period of time in a special designated place and at the end it is mandatory for all soldiers to complete the training program and to have desired level of skills.

This is considered a MUST procedure for all of them.

The training process is divided into phases with different levels of intensity and responsibility.

- First stage is focused on the preparation of the individual and is the responsibility of the Parent Unit Commander focusing on administrative and logistical processing in preparation for phase 2 training. Topics covered include fitness tests, weapons training, personal admin and logistical admin.

- Next stage is focused on the preparation of the battalion deploying and is focused on Platoon/Troop and Company level skills. It is the responsibility of the lead brigade to oversee this phase of training coordinated by a Task Force chaired by the Executive Officer of the Brigade. Most likely several companies will be training concurrently to develop and fine tune skills that will be required for overseas deployment. Topics covered in this phase are wide and varied including but not limited to Helicopter drills, Communications, Intelligence, Medical and Map reading.

- Third stage for training is focused on the Overseas Battalion and is designed to build on the training in Phase 2 with a view to building a cohesive Unit capable of carrying out its tasks to the standard required for deployment to its operational environment. It involves modules on particular skills for the mission which are then evaluated by means of the Mission Readiness Exercise.

- Last stage is conducted whilst deployed in the operational environment and is focused on In-Theatre situational and environmental training to compliment prior training.

Because of recent military missions history and worldwide implications in different types of tasks, it became as a necessity to have a common understanding of what is mandatory to be known before deployment. The Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) were designed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to provide the common and essential training required for all personnel – military, police, and civilian – who serve on UN peacekeeping missions. The CPTMs are circulated by DPKO and provide both a list of topics as well as actual training materials usable as lesson plans. National peacekeeping training centres worldwide incorporate the CPTMs into their classroom courses as an important part of their students’ training prior to their deployment on any UN peacekeeping mission³.

3.2 Deployment.

“Today’s operating environment demands a much greater degree of language and regional expertise requiring years, not weeks, of training and education, as well as a greater understanding of the factors that drive social change”.⁴

³ Peace Operations Training Institute - Core Pre-deployment Training Materials
⁴ Quadrennial Defence Review - February 2010
For military conflict stabilisation and peace building efforts to have a chance of success, there are a lot of gaps that need to be solved and/or closed.

A major aspect that was fully understood by military in Bosnia was language barrier. For future missions it has become necessary to develop language skills, particularly for military troops from Eastern Europe (Czech, Bulgarian and Romanian soldiers). Nevertheless, communication skills were pretty good, despite the initial lack of experience, because of language similarities and other common territorial expressions. The use of English language, as a standard, in military operations was seen as an advantage for all native speakers (UK, USA, Ireland or Canada). On the other hand, for French military troops, the use of English instead of their own language was a big disadvantage from the perception point of view. As an example, in Deliberate Force operation in Bosnia, the use of both English and French language for translation was received as an obstacle for troops and a big time consuming.

U.S. military allies view language barriers, rather than incompatible technology, as a primary obstacle to multinational operations. Computer networks can be connected rather easily, especially modern systems that are built with commercial technology. But the inability of troops from different countries to communicate because they don’t speak the same language creates more fundamental problems, said officers attending a U.S. Marine Corps war game in Potomac, Md. Efforts by the United States and other NATO members to promote “interoperability” between military forces and to encourage countries to contribute troops to current operations fail to take into account the difficulties experienced by non-English speakers, said Lt. Col. Marc Humbert, a member of the French Joint Staff and a liaison officer at U.S. Joint Forces Command.

“The biggest challenge is language,” he said. “It’s a significant factor for us and other countries, working in an English-speaking environment. Some of us master the language, but to what level does it go? At what level can we integrate units? This is a very big issue.”

U.S. officials regard “information sharing” as the most significant hurdle in coalition operations, but often don’t take into account whether the information can be understood by those who don’t speak English. “Everybody has networks, and you can plug into the network, but if the information is in a foreign language, can you translate it?,” Humbert asked.

No easy fix exists to this problem, Humbert noted. “We have been trying to develop procedures. But I would submit that total integration is not possible with non-English speaking countries.”

Among French troops, a small number (between 10 and 20 percent) speak Arabic. But even they couldn’t communicate with Arab-speaking Iraqis, for example, because French-Arabs, who usually hail from Northern Africa, speak a different from of Arabic.
Language is critical for communication. International aviation has acknowledged the importance of a common language by standardizing messages for use. The system is vulnerable when the complex, unexpected, and unprecedented occurrences need to be described. Common language remains a problem in all domains including multinational participants. Even English speakers report confusions when sharing complex information with those from different English speaking nations.

Other officers from English-speaking U.S. allied countries agreed that language differences can hinder interoperability. They also highlighted other reasons why multinational operations can be daunting. “We have wrestled for years with interoperability,” said Maj. Sean Wyatt, of the Canadian Army.

It is evident that cultural differences in language, nonverbal behavior, and body language (e.g., differences in voice inflections or facial expressions; norms regarding acceptable length of eye contact or personal distance; variations in handshakes) may all pose challenges to intercultural communication in multinational military contexts (Desimone, Werner, & Harris, 2002; Gillespie, 2002). This made things very difficult, as neither side really understood the other’s culture. For the involved actors, it became very important to have soldiers as translators. Some were just that; they translated from one language to another. But the issue was still there, because, more than that in translation there was no cultural consideration involved. Some times, translators were able to relate not just was said, but the meaning behind it. Interpreters were vital to the success of the mission, in training, and in the conduct of operation. Without them the gap that lay between “us” and “them” could not be bridged. Culturally diverse teams need the knowledge and the tools necessary to make differences explicit.

Bowman and Pierce (2003) suggest that an understanding of how culture affects teamwork has provided critical information for the development of training tools to help leaders and teams overcome cultural barriers. Bowman and Pierce identify two training tools that have been developed. The first is a communication skills training tool that can help individuals to develop understanding and tolerance of culturally diverse cognitive styles. The second is a web-based decision game designed to provide information and situational awareness of cultural differences in cognition. Both tools will have application before, upon arrival, and throughout the period of deployment and will be available to US and other leaders and teams, thereby creating opportunities for national and multinational team building. With increasing emphasis being placed on interoperability of systems between coalition partners, Bowman and Pierce (2003) suggest that this project will provide a foundation for continued linkages between nations in technology and human systems.

Finally, some further recommendations regarding language training in the context of multinational military operations should be mentioned. In addition to language training, dictionaries of common terms must be developed and distributed, including logistical and tactical terms (Marshall et al., 1997). As mentioned earlier, acronyms and abbreviations should be avoided in order to ensure a clear understanding of terms within a coalition, and operational and logistic plans and orders should be written in greater detail and clarity to avoid misunderstandings (Bowman, 1997). Once again, it is recommended that native English speakers are able to speak other languages, in order to build mutual understanding and respect (Potts, 2004; Bowman, 1997; Stewart, et al., 2004), and that they speak slowly and avoid colloquialisms (Bowman & Pierce, 2003).

In summary, as the composition of multinational military operations becomes more diverse, the need for leaders to bring groups of different cultures together to function as a

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unit becomes more crucial (Graen & Hui, 1999). Thorough preparation and training is vital if commanders are to be culturally aware and sensitive, patient, adaptive, and tolerant (Soeters et al., 2004). In general, all personnel who are deployed in multinational military coalitions should have thorough training in the cultural aspects of their work. Attention must be paid to the cultural characteristics of both the coalition partners and the local population. Steps taken to develop common operating procedures, to train together, and to educate future leaders will help ensure that future coalitions successfully accomplish their assigned mission (Bowman, 1997).

3.3 Post-Deployment.
Several major lessons learned (or re-learned) have emerged from involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan after U.S. 2001 events. These include the need for advisors to forge strong relationships with their counterparts and linguists, the need to learn about and adapt to the unconventional military advising mission, and other key lessons that follow in this section.

- Building strong relationships with counterparts is the most important aspect of the advising mission. The most important method to develop a productive advisor-counterpart relationship is to create a strong personal connection. Such a relationship results from advisors’ concerted efforts to learn about their counterparts’ personal characteristics and idiosyncrasies. A productive relationship also comes from gaining greater knowledge of the overall context in which the counterparts function and then applying a variety of relevant techniques to leverage this understanding to create mutual trust and a solid bond.

- Attain cross-cultural competence to help build combat advisor-counterpart relationships and enhance advisory team survivability.

- Acquire culture-specific competence about a counterpart and the cultural context in which that person thinks and acts. To succeed, advisors must learn relevant and detailed knowledge about the counterpart, the counterpart’s organization, and, the host nation and region.

- Accept a counterpart’s hospitality, an draw on the power of informal socializing to build relationships.

- Use humor including comical self-deprecation, to build rapport with counterparts.

- Wisely navigate delicate, sensitive issues when interacting with counterparts. Despite warnings from advisor training and doctrine about avoiding taboo topics (politics, religion, etc.), sometimes candid, but private, conversations about these topics build advisor-counterpart bonds. However, appropriate timing and settings for such conversations is essential.

- Practice cultural stretching: advisors must often enter discomfort zones and tolerate or participate in some unusual or culturally challenging events to bond with counterparts (e.g., trying to eat distasteful foods, letting counterparts hold the advisor’s hand, understanding that counterparts might apply harsh punishments to their own troops, and so on).

- Carefully navigate cases when cultural stretching goes too far. At times advisors need to politely refrain from events (e.g., that cross moral boundaries) and also may need to try to influence counterparts to stop certain actions without disrespecting counterparts.

- Remain firm while not being either commanding or too diplomatic; strong, respectful, and courteous military advisors gain their counterparts’ respect.

- Perform cost-benefit analyses about taking mission-related physical and cultural risks to help build rapport with counterparts and advance the mission. For example, sometimes advisors must work hard to acquire permission to reside on their counterparts’
bases, travel in their counterparts’ vehicles (or at least to frequently travel in convoys with their counterparts), soften their conventional military appearance standards (e.g., U.S. Special Forces advisors sometimes grow beards or wear military patches given to them by their counterparts), and so on.

- Linguists are vital intercultural intermediaries. A second major post-2001 advisory lesson learned is the need for advisors to work effectively with linguists (also known as translators or interpreters). During the Iraq and Afghan conflicts, only a very small handful of advisors spoke their counterpart’s language at a working level, or worked with counterparts who spoke English at a high enough level of competence to preclude misunderstandings. Thus, the overwhelming majority of U.S. advisors had to use linguists, many of whom lacked the vocabulary and cultural understanding of both sides to provide translations beyond a basic level. This presented a special problem because without effective communications advisory missions are doomed to failure. Therefore, successful advisors developed special skills to effectively lead, build rapport with, and make full use of their linguists’ talents.

- Conventional forces must adapt to the unconventional military advising mission.

4. Conclusion

Some of these conclusions are based on a study made by an international team, regarding Military Co-operation in Multinational Missions: The Case of EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Working in international environment became a normal „way of living” for modern military society. A progressive increase of multinational forces employed in several missions under the aegis of UN, NATO and, recently, EU represents one of the significant changes within the armed forces of European countries in the last decade.[5]

In the last few years, in a trend towards a growing integration, soldiers of different nationalities have more and more interacted and co-operated under an integrated command structure. Particularly, this phenomenon was a matter for Western countries’ soldiers, but not only for them: the “internationalization of military life” (Klein/Kümmele 2000) is a global phenomenon. For instance, one of the most multi-ethnic and multi-cultural armies ever assembled was the UN’s peacekeeping force in ex-Yugoslavia, with troops from 44 nations representing almost all geo-political areas of the world. As far as this research is concerned, EUFOR, which replaced the NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) on December 2, 2004, is strongly characterized by multi-nationality, being supported by 33 countries, 22 of which members of the EU.

In order to enhance multinational co-operation and to foster intercultural understanding it is important to establish and extend common practices and procedures, since common skills and standards as well as mutual trust and cohesion mainly develop by “doing” co-operation, through concerted action in practice. However, cultural differences and obstacles do not only influence co-operation between soldiers coming from different countries but also are an important factor determining the relations between the armed forces of an international mission (like EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the local population. Up to now we know very little about how soldiers see and behave with people they are supposed to protect and/or bring peace to, nor how those conversely perceive the role of the international military actors in their country. In low-intensity operations like Althea aiming at supporting the peace building and democratization process in a particular country or region the duties and responsibilities of the international armed forces consist to
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a great extent in keeping contact with the local authorities and other international actors. In this case an operation’s success also largely depends on how interaction and communication between the parties involved works out. For this reason future cross-cultural research on low intensity military operations should not only focus on problems and challenges within the multinational military organisation alone, but also extent to analysing the relationship between multinational armed forces and their environment, i.e. other international institutions, the local authorities and the local population. For in the end this might turn out to be as important for achieving a mission’s goal as a well-functioning co-operation of the various members of multinational armed forces.\(^6\)

Multinational coalitions will become more prevalent in the future as nations seek alternate methods of resolving conflict. With the increasing complexity of such coalitions, and with new partners, future coalition commanders will face a myriad of challenges, including the integration of culturally diverse groups and the establishment of an effective command and control structure (Davis, 2000a). This environment will demand a greater range of leadership skills and competencies, the ability to overcome cultural barriers to effective teamwork (such as cultural differences in power distance and decision making), and an ability to lead within various command structures. Leaders must recognize that both national interests and cultural factors will influence the setting of coalition goals and objectives, place constraints on the coalition force, and determine a nation’s contribution in terms of organization, capability, and command authority (Davis, 2000a). Through the development of intercultural leadership skills, innovative command structures, and thorough coordination, liaison, and cooperation, both political interests and cultural diversity in coalition operations can be addressed, and cultural diversity in multinational military operations can be used effectively as a positive resource.

The focus in multinational military operations must be toward achieving unity of purpose, as opposed to unity of doctrine or command. To achieve unity of purpose, operational level commanders must develop mutual confidence amongst the military leadership of the coalition partners to ensure that a balance is struck between competing political and military interests and to ensure that cultural issues are addressed (Davis, 2000a). Indeed, of the intangibles of coalitions’ command and control matters, mutual confidence and trust between partners may be the most important consideration. Being able to trust is essential to unity of effort, much more so in the case of nonconventional operations in which the commander must blend the skills of culturally diverse national contingents so that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (Barabé, 1999). More research is needed, however, to examine the issue of trust and reliability in a multicultural environment.

In the current operating environment, mission success relies on the ability to improve relationships with foreign individuals, organizations, or militaries. Service personnel tend to deploy to a variety of areas in the world throughout their careers and are only assigned to certain jobs and locations for relatively short periods. They need efficient, effective ways to acquire a culture and language capability. The notion of cross-cultural competence (3C) has been developed to reflect this requirement.[6] One definition of it is “the ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively engage individuals from distinct cultural backgrounds to achieve the desired effect, despite not having an in-depth knowledge of the other culture.[7]”

Taking into consideration that actual missions are regional, there are many local issues that must be understood and solved. For a person to understand and win a battle it is

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\(^6\) Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr - Military Co-operation in Multinational Missions.
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necessary to become a diplomat. These are the most important habits of highly effective warrior-diplomats.

- Adopt a cross-culturalist stance;

![Adopting a Cross-Culturalist Stance]

1. Know yourself and how you’re different
2. Know the value of (a little) cultural understanding
3. Frame intercultural experiences as opportunities to learn

![Seeking and Extending Cultural Understanding]

4. Pay attention to cultural surprises
5. Test your knowledge
6. Reflect on your experiences

![Using Cultural Understanding to Guide Action]

7. Adapt how and what you express

Fig. 5

- Seek and extend your cultural understanding;
- Apply cultural understanding to guide action.

In my opinion, these mental strategies have implications for effective mission performance and mission readiness: preparing for deployments overseas, gaining traction within a new culture or environment, and learning from experiences.

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