THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY BETWEEN INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGES

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Abstract:
The last years impose cutting the defense budgets from all the countries around the world, but much more for those who didn’t succeed to have at least 1,5%/year of economic growth. These uncoordinated cuts in defense spending, for the European countries, have eroded the EU’s role as a security actor in what is now a multipolar world. Therefore, it is very important to gather all the Heads of the member states and the EU institutions with responsibilities to strengthen defense cooperation in the EU, and put them at same table, show them which urgent measures have to be taken for increasing the EU’s strategic security. It is very important to change the way of thinking if we want to have “A secure Europe in a better world”. [i]

Member states could achieve much more value for money than the €190 billion that they spend to keep up 28 national armies, comprising roughly 1.5 million service personnel.[ii]

Key words: EU Defense, Defense activities, European Security and Defense, European Defense Union

1. Introduction

The paper will be edited in English using Times New Roman 12, Justify, line spacing 1p. The paper shall be written using Page setup A4, orientation „Portrait”, „Mirror”. As you can see, for the title of the paper you must use 16pt, Centered, Bold, Times New Roman. Leave two blank lines and then type Author's Name and Academic Title (14pt Times New Roman, centered), Institution /Department/ University/ Town/ Country (in 12pt Times New Roman, centered).

The end of the twentieth century, more precisely in the early decades of the eight century, marks a number of changes regarding the concept of European Security. In a Europe, divided into military blocs, where the arms race is constantly growing, the new concept of security is based on the consolidation of relations between states in Europe on new principles, and "...the policy of the blocks, will have to make room for a security organization, calling for a system of commitments and concrete measures to exclude the use of force and to ensure the peaceful development of European states in a climate of detente, understanding and cooperation". [iii]

Common European Security and Defense Policy represent a new challenge for the European Union, although the idea of a common defense policy is not a recently phenomena. Development of a business idea of European Security and Defense has its roots in the first three years of the post-world war II period.
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2. What is Common European Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)?

European Security and Defense Policy is one of the main priorities of the European countries, in the context of increasingly diverse threats to stability and security of the European Union. The idea of laying the foundations of a common policy on security and defense has not been regarded as a necessity, and subsequently has been treated with "low priority" by highly developed Western countries. However, the existence of a major threat to their safety, danger given by the presence of a major concentration of forces from the USSR, in central and Eastern Europe, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have decided to address again the idea of a common policy on security and defense. Moreover, they put bases of the Brussels Treaty Organization by signing the Treaty of Cultural, Social, Economic Cooperation and Collective Defense. Even if the United States had a lot of troops stationed in the Federal Germany territory, this was not a solution upon long term, and this new way of thinking gave another impulse and greater development of the new common security policy, by the four signatory states.

Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP or just CSDP) intend to allow development capabilities of its Union civil and military crisis management and conflict prevention at the international level. Thus, its contribution to maintaining peace and international security, under the UN Charter, would increase considerably, i.e. power its economic and demographic. It should be noted that ESDP does not involve creating a European armed, but it is evolving in a manner consistent and coordinated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

European Union High Representative Javier Solana said, based on the size and economic power of the European Union that Europe has to take/to assume, as United States is doing, a global strategic responsibility. Hence, in December 2003, Javier Solana was empowered by the member states to develop a security strategy for EU. Starting from the Petersberg declaration presented at the June 1992 Western European Union (WEU) Council of Ministers near Bonn, Germany, he succeed in December 2003 to finish so called document “A Secure Europe in a Better World” – Security Strategy for Europe, which analyzed the EU’s security environment and identified key security challenges and subsequent political implications for the EU. The implementation of the document was revised in 2008.

3. Internal constraints versus external challenges

CSDP was based on Petersberg tasks and according the article II.4 of “Petersberg Declaration”, from the Western European Council of Ministers, which took place in Bonn in 1992, there were three purposes for which military units might be deployed:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

The term “peacemaking” was adopted as a consensual solution and as a synonym for “peace-enforcement”. The Petersberg tasks were subsequently incorporated into Article 17 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) through the Treaty of Amsterdam. The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (TEU Art. 42) then further expanded these tasks to include:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks;
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- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking;
- joint disarmament operations;
- military advice and assistance tasks;
- post-conflict stabilization tasks.[v]

To enable them to assume their responsibilities concerning on the whole range of conflict prevention and crisis management, EU Member States are required to develop more effective military capabilities and establish new political and military structures, for the adoption of decisions and its management of the activities. However, Europe, as an organization, has certain difficulties as regards appropriate equipment to its troops. So, he does not hold the basic requirements for a war, that, for instance, transport of heavy armament, armament high-technology industries, etc., as well as troops sufficient to be carried out, even if it has more soldiers than the United States. But before to engage in a war, Europe must be, before all, responsible for its own security and cannot expect the United States to intervene whenever there is a crisis on the continent.

Listing a few of the risks end of the XX century, among which the temptation an American isolation and new tensions between Washington and Beijing, French president Jacques Chirac stressed the fact that "a truly multipolar there may be only if the European Union becomes itself a real power". After creating the common currency EURO, the continent must tackle a second-largest challenge, the defense area: "Kosovo confirmed fully the need and even affirmation emergency a Europe of defense, which act either in Atlantic Alliance breast, be self-contained manner, depending on the nature crisis", said Jacques Chirac.[vi]

Major crisis in Kosovo highlighted the need of a reestablishing the balance between the United States of America and Europe concerning the participation in the settlement crisis management and conflict in the European region, through an increase of the role of our continent endowed with a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The objective of the European Union is to have autonomy to take decisions and, where NATO, is not engaged directly, to initiate and then to carry out military operations in response to crises in the area of interest. But it is a fact that a European Community promotes the increase extended stability by increasing confidence based on collective security, political unit and trading.

The idea of an autonomous European defense led by default and in the discussions controversial within the EU, relating, in particular, from the weakness of existing structures and complexity their roles, but also of American commitment on European soil. Consensus appeared around willpower to "Europeanization" defense of obscured in reality numerous contradictions and disagreements, with regard to the matters strategic, military and institutional capacities of such a jerk. Also, there is no harmonization of Member States on final designs and arrangements for European defense has been for a long time that the institutions created for this purpose prove to be less effective. Another controversy is related to the military statute of the European states. The four states are not neutral (traditionally or constitutional), while the other belong to NATO, and a large part of them prefer American protection expenses in place of the modernization of the military. What's
more, many Member States have already concluded between them treated by bilateral and multilateral military cooperation.

On taking up his duties as secretary general of the Alliance, George Robertson said: "transatlantic link remains an effectiveness path for NATO", "it is not necessary to spend more money for defense and security, but to spend it better". [vii]

Safety depends on the stability, as stability cannot be achieved without a healthy economy and only a healthy economy is capable of sustaining efforts to safety. Unfortunately, the latest events in the economic area, both in Europe as well as global economy does not show a significant improvement and are not even encouraging in this respect, the crisis affecting countries budgets particularly in the military field.

The climate of stability in Europe can be improved through the development of a common European policy on Security and Defense consistent and constructive, which also have preventive effects in areas with high potential of insecurity on the continent.

For instability and insecurity - a variety and amplitude unprecedented - it is necessary to the precautionary approach in place of one reactive or curative, focused on policy objectives and not on threats.

In the first half of the 1990s Western European Union has experienced a process of consolidation, by accepting in the organization Spain, Portugal (in 1990) and Greece (in 1992), by means of the integration of the associate members in the Council WEU, Iceland or Norway, and Turkey (in 1991), through the establishment, under French impulse, of institutional structures permanent Military Committee, the Institute for Security Studies in Paris (1990), the Satellite Center from Torrejon (1991), the Planning Cell (1992), the Western European Armaments Group, (WEAG, 1992) and the Circumstantial Center (1995) -, as well as by the appearance of European Multinational Forces - EUROCORP (European body), EUROFOR (Force the European Dry), European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), Group European Air, Multinational Division Center, the force titles like British-Nederland, etc.

Attacks on the 11th of September 2001 in New York and Washington and followed by the "war on terror" brought the fight against terrorism and extremist movements in first place in the agenda of work on security issues of the leaders of countries Western Europe and not only.

The terrorist attacks in Istanbul in November 2003, in Madrid, in March 2004, the four suicides bombing in the heart of London, July 2005, and do not forget neither the terrorists attack from France last year, nor the killing of a soldier by two Muslim guys in the middle of the street in London (2013), showed that Europe is not only a target of terrorist attacks but also a basis for global terrorism.

Furthermore, in our days France is facing with the highest threat of a jihadist attack, which has reached a level "without precedent" and new attacks are inevitable. A high-level official in the defense ministry, said that this "threat is permanent". [viii]
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Against this new scourge facing Europe, the Member States have agreed to act in common, in the spirit solidarity, in the event that one of them is target of a terrorist attack, and to mobilize all the tools at their disposal.

With considerably increased terrorist threats against some Member States, as well as confronting the migration at a large scale and ever-growing population of Eastern Europe to Western Europe, but also in order to increase confidence and safety European population, the European Union and its Member States were armed with new modern tools: the warrant for his arrest, the defining terrorism, Euro justice, which fully complies with civil liberties and European Constitution.

Cross-border traffic of drugs, women, illegal immigrants and weapons do no more than to undermine internal security of European states, and feeds also conflicts in other parts of the world. None of threats presented in European security strategy are not purely military in nature, and complexity and interdependence of threats requires an approach which combines a broad set of tools. European Union only recently started buying military instruments, but it also has some experience in applying a range of foreign policy issues international security policy: external trade, development cooperation, international environmental policy, international police, justice and intelligence, cooperation, immigration policy, and multilateral diplomacy.

Let us not forget a new type of threat which may produce more damages than a Sol-Air-Missile and which is highly unpredictable: cyber terrorism. In this modernized world where each network is interconnected with other two or three networks, cyber defense should be if not the first on the top of priorities at least on the second place.

As we have seen so far, CSDP faces too many challenges and until now EU was not able as a Union to take the best measures in order to encounter its. Nevertheless, in last three years a major problem coming from the Eastern borders of the EU (internal war in Ukraine) is putting under the question mark the ability to manage a new huge challenge: real war. As well as Crimean crisis (one year ago) started another type of “war”: the economic one with Russia. Therefore, those have revived awareness in the EU about the possibility of military attack and occupation in Europe. [ix]

It is well known that the economical and financial crisis across the Globe (more or less), created a good opportunity for many countries to adapt and review their budgets. That led on massive allocation cuts for the defense, based on relative peace in the world (at that time) and starts to build new concepts for common defense: globalization and specialization.

Even if the CSDP principles were not directed to an EU army, these new challenges made EU states take into consideration very seriously the concept of Globalization and armies’ specialization, which, as always, have good parts and bad parts, depends which side “of the fence” you are.
All these budgeting cuts, made EU member states change their opinions and to start thinking seriously of Pooling & Sharing as a short/long term solution. For doing that first of all they have to convince themselves is a viable plan for their countries and secondly to convince peoples from their countries.

For CSDP low level of defense spending will be a major problem, in order to achieve the goal presented in the European Security – “A Secure Europe in a Better World”. To respond of these cuts, countries had to adapt their expenses. So that, many procurement programs were aborted or postponed (France give up to upgrade their Mirrage Fighter planes, Italy canceled frigates acquisitions and cut down the Eurofighter command with 25, Germany abolished conscription and reduced the manpower from MoD with almost 15,000)[xi], the years of use of the equipments and techniques had to be increased, which conduct inevitably to a lower level of readiness of troops, as well as the retirement age was increased (see what happen in Romania).

Considering those presented above, pooling & sharing has to go to the next level starting with reviewing policies and strategies. If you will analyze the infrastructure of the Europe Union you will be amazed how many opportunities there are.

With a lot of industry (cars, chemicals, biotechnology, food), very well developed transportation system, Research & Development, many military education institutions, and so on, European Union should head his eyes on that globalization and specialization of the nations armies in terms of sustainability and effectiveness.

According to Giovanni Faleg and Alessandro Giovannini in their 2012 report “The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defense: Making a virtue of necessity?” three important developments have reinvigorated the debate on EU military integration through pooling & sharing:

   a) the provision by the Lisbon Treaty of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) as an instrument allowing groups of member states to cooperate more closely, thus attaining objectives that otherwise would be unattainable at 28;

   b) the adoption of two Directives (43/EC in late 2008 and 81/EC in early 2009) aimed at simplifying procedures for moving military goods among member states and increasing the amount of defense procurement that is open to competition across the EU;
c) the adoption of the Ghent Framework in December 2010, under the Belgian Presidency, exploring the feasibility of intensified EU cooperation and P&S regarding military capabilities in areas such as training, logistics, medical, transport and communication. Still, these aren’t enough. The reluctance of the states who are more developed in industry, for not sharing their knowledge, and being afraid not to lose the advantage of investments they did so far is a big wall in front of CSDP. On the other hand states don’t want to involve in expensive cooperative programs with others, therefore giving each other greater visibility of what they plan to spend on defense and how they plan to spend it, although it could be cheaper for their own budgets.

For that the EU institutions as the European Commission and European Defense Agency (EDA), might play an important role in order to facilitate coordination, identify the areas of cooperation, and assists with the consolidation of defense industries. They should take a look of the US which changed military capabilities for doing more efficient and developing the concept of small teams with high trained personnel. Furthermore, military capabilities and interoperability improvements can be made through more effective spending by prioritizing expenditure on missions and capabilities – and by encouraging smaller and better trained forces rather than personnel-centered defense budgets. Keep in mind that we need forces to deter and defend EU not to attack others, as well as those forces could be also those NATO forces, to not double the efforts of nations.

A major crisis, in the European Union was the war of Libya, which revealed again, if it was necessary, the lack of coherence in EU states approach regarding cohesion and effectiveness, as well as reducing military spending and starting a massive competition between them is not a sustainable solution for achieving CSDP goal. Nevertheless, US interests changed regarding Europe since the “fall” of the Cold War, and they are focused on what’s happening to the South East of Asia, where China became more efficient and his growth in the last four years shows the world that they are “somebody”, and North Korea increases his threats for a war with South Korea and Japan. So, EU has to become more independent and EU head states have to stop thinking as they are only “one item”. CSDP need all not only ONE.

EU has to be careful about pooling & sharing capabilities to not overlap with the NATO “Smart Defense” initiative. Otherwise it will be a waste of efforts, energy and money. The future of CSDP depends for the political will to consult and cooperate on military capabilities for turning the EU into a global actor and a security provider, not only for his citizens, but also for his partners.

The lack of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, during the Libyan war, as well as refueling the aircraft in the air, highlighted the most needed capabilities. In the same time, EU states are part of NATO so they have multiple capabilities which have worked together using the same procedures, and maybe some of them they fought in Iraq or Afghanistan. Why EU does not use that in his advantage? Why they are waiting for US to take initiative and tell them what to do?
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The Eastern borders of the EU are vulnerable since the civil war started in Ukraine and Russia annexed Crimea. Not to mention Transnistrian situation from Moldova Republic, where Russia continued to provide support to the separatist regime militarily, politically and economically, allowing him to survive and giving it a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis Moldova. But, DO NOT FORGET Cyprus crisis which is far for being finished, and Kosovo Crisis also.

4. Conclusion

CSDP is far away to be effectiveness for the EU citizens. Should we analyze these threats, the following questions become obvious:

- **terrorism**: can be fully eradicated??
- **proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)**: could be stopped in any way??
- **regional conflicts**: can be managed in order to be finished/eradicated??
- **State Failure**: there are any chances to avoid that??
- **organized crime**: it can be managed for getting read of this??

The answer of all these questions can’t be found here, but what I have tried to make was to present some very important issues which EU institutions is facing. The “war on terror” has put the fight against terrorist and extremist on the top of the agenda regarding security policies, because of the fact that Europe is not only a target for terrorist, but also a base for it.

Regional conflicts and the proliferation of WMD are getting hand in hand. Regional conflicts can lead to terrorism, extremism as well as state failure, and can provide many opportunities of arms race and the possibility for terrorists buying WMD (Tokyo subway attack with the poisonous nerve gas Sarin).

Let us consider the Ukraine regional conflict, where according Kostiantyn Yelisieiev, Ukraine's Ambassador to the EU, the “first short-term goal of the Russian leadership is to disrupt the process of financial and economic stabilisation, and not permit Ukraine to proceed with the needed internal political, economic and financial reforms. Indeed, the economic situation is not an easy one, because my country is in a de facto state of war.”

So, state failure could increase the terrorist acts, extremism, and for sure, will provide opportunity for organized crime such as: cross-border trafficking, in drugs, women, illegal migrants, and weapons, which not only undermine the internal security of European states, but they also fuel conflicts in other parts of the world.

The CSDP has to bear with countries budget constraints, and threats/challenges, which request doubling the effort.

For helping and improving CSDP we need a proactive approach. Asses the risks, develop a European Union defense army, increase spending for intelligence, developing a strategic culture that stimulates, when necessary, rapid intervention in hot areas, are the key point of the CSDP which have to be changed. The future of the CSDP cannot be predicted, but it is more likely this policy shall continue moving forward, depending on each step for political will and national budget allocations.
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References:


